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Abstract 
The capture of Mosul and the ensuing blitzkrieg of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
over the Sunni majority region of Syria and Iraq reminded the world of the seriousness of the threat posed 
by the Salafist-jihadists. By connecting the tactic of “the management of savagery” with external 
resources and links, ISIL seems to have succeeded in materializing the full potential that the new type of 
conflict can pose to the existing international order. The “New War”, as formulated by Mary Kaldor, is 
the product of the dual erosion of nation states that globalization has brought about. Due to the growing 
malfunctioning of nation states, it becomes more difficult to secure the governmental monopoly of 
organized violence and border control, while there is also the internationalization of criminal groups’ 
networks. So far, the U.S.-led coalition has waged war against ISIL, but the strategy based on older 
thinking about national security helps to proliferate ISIL-type threats rather than to contain them. One of 
the main reasons of the failure lies in the context that the U.S. administration has been supporting 
extremist networks as tools to subvert the regime it does not want. This is attested to by the fact that the 
ISIL is the end product of U.S. covert interventions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Syria. 
Therefore, a different type of remedy is necessary. The article assesses the effectiveness of concerted 
policing and the exchange of intelligence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in its fight against 
the Islamic terrorism in Central Asia and concludes that a regional cooperation based on pragmatic and 
limited purposes, rather than a military alliance based on some shared values, is a better model to cope 
with the new type of threats as represented by ISIL. Such regional cooperation has the potential to bring 
about more stable administration and provides the ground of economic stability as it gives its member 
states more resilience to the outside political pressures that are detrimental to the fight against terrorism, 
in addition to giving them the grounds for economic development with the purpose of mutual benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
The world was stunned by the abrupt rise of the “Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant” (ISIL)1 and the unprecedented brutality it exercised in the summer of 
                                                 
1  The author calls the group as “ISIL” mainly on the following grounds: Although the group’s control 
has so far been limited within the border of Iraq and Syria, they envisage as their territory the 
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2014. While the U.S.-led coalition took up concerted efforts to fight back against 
the Islamist assault, their air strikes so far have not produced impressive results. 
On the contrary, as the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris highlighted, the number 
of sympathizers is constantly rising, partly due to their exposure in the 
international mass media, helped by ISIL’s sophisticated social media strategy. 
The events remind us of the seriousness of the threats posed by international 
Jihadism, and the difficulty in eliminating them. 
The article tries to find a possible remedy for this seemingly obstinate 
malady, making use of recent findings in the field of comparative conflict studies. 
2. Regional conflicts: Withering away or thriving? 
Since the end of the Second World War, the humanity has witnessed a 
cumulative rise in the number of conflicts. According to the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), the annual number of military conflicts taking place all 
over the world remained less than 20 by the middle of the 1960s (See Fig. 1). 
Thereafter, it took a drastic upturn and has never fallen below the level of 30 since 
1975, reaching a record high of 52 in 1991. The number declined after then, more 
or less constantly, until 2002. At that point, it shows a sign of stagnation, ranging 
between 31 and 37 (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014a). 
                                                                                                                                 
historical region known as aş-Şam that includes contemporary Lebanon, Jordan, and a part of South-
eastern Turkey. The group has a significant number of supporters (or dormant cells) there, and, as in 
the case of Northern Lebanon, is committed to subversive activities. 
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Figure 1 
Armed Conflict by Regions 1946-2013 
Source: Themnér & Wallensteen (2014b); UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/66/66314_1armed-conflict-by-region.pdf 
 
How to interpret the trend is a focus of academic discussions. Optimistic 
scholars like to relate it with positive signs of global peace. Pinker (2011), for 
instance, attributes the decline to the success of a new form of global security 
governance. For him, the post-Cold War period is the latest phase of “humane” 
development and the natural outcome of the lenient nature of human beings. In the 
same vein, the Human Security Report (HSR) describes the decline as part of a 
general reduction of violence recorded in the past decade, like the global drop in 
battle deaths or the rarity of inter-state conflicts, i.e. high-intensity conflicts, and 
attributes it to the elimination of “proxy wars” (Human Security Research Group, 
2014). 
The real story, however, is not so simple. It is true that the number of battle 
deaths has been in constant decline since the early 1950s (Lacina & Gleditsch, 
2005). However, the number of conflicts increased almost fourfold from 1952 to 
1992. This is partly due to the increase in the number of states – by twofold in the 
given period (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014a) – but the gap still remains widely 
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open. Given the constant development of military technology and the 
intensification of its killing ability, it may seem enigmatic. The answer can be 
found in the following context. The end of European colonial rule resulted in a 
sharp increase in the number of states from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. In 
the new states, the governments often failed in establishing physical control over 
the territory or effective administration over the population, let alone the 
population's political allegiance, mainly due to their deeply embedded economic 
dependency to their former European masters. The fragility of governance gave 
rise to dissidents, and the difficulty of physical control allowed the latter to 
procure arms. At the same time, however, due to their general penury, both 
government and opposition forces could not mobilize large armies with brand new 
weapons. The end result is the frequency of small conflicts contained to a discrete 
territory. The fact that the overwhelming majority of conflicts were taking place 
mostly in Asia and Africa corroborates this reasoning (See Fig. 1). In other words, 
both the sharp rise in the number of conflicts and the decline of their mortality 
between the 1950s and the 1980s were the products of the malfunctioning of 
newly formed nation-states. 
As for the decline in the number of conflicts after 1991, we can apply the 
same theory. According to UCSD datasets, the peak of the conflicts was between 
1990 and 1992. During this period, the world was constantly engulfed with more 
than 50 conflicts. The sharp rise was apparently the byproduct of the fall of the 
Soviet Bloc, as it chronologically corresponded to it.2After three consecutive 
extraordinary turbulent years (See Fig. 2), the frequency of conflicts decreased. 
The average was reduced to 42 for the rest of the 1990s, and 34.9 in the first 
decade of the 21st century. The trend seems to confirm the optimists’ accounts, 
but, if one recalls that the average of the 1970s was 31.2, we have not yet returned 









                                                 
2  The change of U.S. policy is an additional factor. After the “Fall of Communism”, Washington 
shifted its support from military dictators whom it had called “Friends of America” to “democratic” 
and less costly regimes. It brought about a number of regime changes and ensuing turmoil. The most 
notorious event was the “Rwanda genocide”. See Takeuchi (2009). 
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 Figure 2 
One-sided Actors and Armed Conflicts, 1989-2013 
Source: ”UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2014, 1989-2013” and Eck and  Hultman  (2007).  
 
There are other sobering facts. The Human Security Research Group, for 
instance, admits that the number of the internationalized intrastate conflicts has 
increased over the past ten years (2014: 90).  
Figure 3 
Type of One-sided Actor 1989-2013 
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Source: ”UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2014, 1989-2013” and Eck and  Hultman. (2007). 
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The trend coincides with the rise in the number of non-state armed conflicts 
in general. The number of conflicts that endanger the civil population is actually 
increasing. In other words, the post-Cold War era is a period with a cumulative 
rise of violence against civilians by non-state military bodies (DCAF & Geneva 
Call, 2015: 18-21). Old UCDP datasets fail to capture this fact. 
The UCDP’s failure comes from its very definition of armed conflicts: “A 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths [Italics are added]” (Themnér & 
Wallensteen, 2014a). This is based on the assumption that the states monopolize 
organized violence and they are the sole entrepreneurs in war. This premise, 
however, has long been obsolete, and has also become powerless in the wake of 
new conflict patterns. 
Our life in the contemporary world is more threatened by non-state 
organized violence, rather than by state sponsored violence (See Fig. 2). 
According the new USDR datasets of one-sided violence,3 out of the total of 78 
actors that were active in conflicts between 1989-2004, only 27 were governments 
and the rests were rebel groups, so the ratio is almost 1:2 (Eck & Hultman, 2007: 
237). The ratio has shifted far more drastically in favor of the latter since the onset 
of the 21st century (See Fig. 3). Now, wars are waged not by states but by non-
state forces. In contrast to the traditional “Westphalian” war in which the state 
system was the norm, contemporary military conflicts have come to take sub-state 
features, as they are waged by militias, paramilitaries, warlord armies, criminal 
gangs, private security firms, and tribal groups. Thus, it is more appropriate to call 
them post-Westphalian wars (Sheehan, 2014: 226). Put another way, the change in 
the post-Cold War era has been toward a further malfunctioning of the state, or the 
universalization of post-colonial conflicts, rather than the general recession of 
wars. 
3. Globalization and the new types of conflicts 
The obsolescence of interstate wars and proliferation of intrastate conflicts 
has been a definite trend since the early 1980s. What merits attention is its overlap 
with the so-called process of globalization. Globalization is often described as a 
process of the rapid intensification of interdependency between various regions on 
the globe both in terms of the production and the consumption of material goods 
and information (McGrew, 2014: 16-20). Although the incorporation of local, 
                                                 
3  One-sided violence is defined as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a 
formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year [Italic is 
added]”. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014). 
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more or less autarkic, economies into a world market has a long history, this trend 
experienced a huge quantitative upsurge from the early 1980s. 
The incentive first came with the intensification of the dependency of 
economically weak states on the Western monetary structure. As a result of the 
new formula guiding international loan policy, known as the “Washington 
consensus”, a growing number of states had to adopt a uniform set of economic 
policies that entailed a contraction of public spending, the privatization of state 
enterprises, deregulations and free trade. The effect was the gradual decay of 
“national economies”. As the governments renounced the major tools to protect 
their market integrity, the territoriality of supply and demand was corroded and 
was systematically replaced by the internationalized division of production. It 
resulted in the specialization and diversification of markets. At the same time, the 
control from above intensified as the worldwide financial system and technology 
accumulation became more cohesive (Woods, 2006). The fall of communist rule 
further precipitated the process and the tide sucked down even industrially 
sophisticated countries (Glaz’iev, 2014). Nowadays, very few governments can 
pursue their economic policy while ignoring international regulations and 
agreements, most of which have little to do with pure economics. 
The end result is the dwindling of state functions in general. As their grip on 
their economies slacken, governments had to downscale their public spending, 
even regarding policing, and more often than not this also entailed outsourcing 
some of their core responsibilities, the most extreme example of which is the 
proliferation of personal military contractors (Motoyama, 2004). The process 
brings about widening social disparity, the constant deterioration of law and order, 
and the eventual loss of physical control over territory. The recent assessment of 
The Institute for Economic and Peace corroborates this reasoning. According to 
its report, only four indicators of world peace “improved” in the last six years. 
These are total military expenditures (slightly decreased), the number of police 
(slightly decreased), the number of heavy weapons and nuclear capability 
(substantial improvement), and the number of armed service personnel (slightly 
reduced). On the other hand, weapons imports and exports increased dramatically 
(by 30%), and such indicators as terrorist impact, homicide rate per 100,000, the 
likelihood of violent demonstrations, and perceptions of criminality were also on 
the rise (Global Peace Index, 2014: 41). All of these factors testify to the general 
loss of governmental control over organized violence. The expansion of the arms 
trade mixed with the downsizing of regular armies implies the privatization of 
militaries. The police budget cut naturally entails a proliferation of ordinary 
crimes, the outburst of public protests, and the intensification of terrorist 
activities. 
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The decline of state functions was not limited to the political and economic 
spheres. It also accompanied the rapid decay of the cultural structure that 
characterized the modern state. Now, the vertically organized cultural structure of 
the nation-state has lost its viability. As the fluency of international 
communication surpassed the customary code of cultural hierarchy, old national 
elites have been superseded by new dominant classes well incorporated into the 
transnational networks of information exchange. National popular education is 
now losing ground, not only because budget cuts degrade its quality, but also 
because national (therefore domestic) instruction can produce no more than 
domestically qualified working forces. If only a small number of wealthy families 
can afford to send their children to institutions with a “global standard” of 
education, the vast majority of the population will be excluded from the benefits 
modern education has hitherto conferred. The corollary to this will be a general 
mistrust of Western education, and a backrush to some traditional values peculiar 
to localities. 
In this aspect, Kaldor’s (2012) analysis on the correlation between 
globalization and “new wars” merits attention. While globalization creates 
inclusive transnational networks of people, it simultaneously excludes and 
atomizes a large number of people. This logic explains the reason why identity 
politics have become a major mobilization tools in the “new wars”. Those who are 
excluded from the global, therefore universal, sets of values have to rely on the 
only alternative principles that are available to them, and they are, more often than 
not, the certain sets of values that are indigenous or specific to a limited number 
of people. 
In this way, the “new wars”, as Kaldor (2012: 5-7, 73-5) puts it, arose in the 
context of the dual erosion of state functions. The nation-state was eroded from 
above by the “transnationalization” of governance and military forces, as well as 
from below by privatization and austerity measures. As the state ceased to hold a 
monopoly on military power, conflicts took different forms and shapes. Non-state 
actors, rather than the regular army, began to play central roles in the conflicts. As 
a result, the distinction among wars, organized crimes, and large-scale violations 
of human rights has become blurred. The distinction among the national army, 
paramilitaries, and foreign mercenaries is becoming less and less recognizable. 
The demarcation line between soldiers and civilians is obscured. Moreover, as 
statecraft and borders became porous, the demarcation line between inside and 
outside is blurred as well. This gives another character to the “new wars”. Despite 
their localized outlook, the “new wars” involve “a myriad of transnational 
connections”. 
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4. The “Islamic State” as a perfect reflection of the “new wars” 
In the “new wars”, the main actors and their tactics are qualitatively 
different from traditional warring forces. A growing number of paramilitaries 
predominates in the regions afflicted by conflicts. Their main method of territorial 
control is the constant instillation of “fear and hatred” among the population, 
through making use of extreme and conspicuous atrocities like systematic murder, 
ethnic cleansing, and rendering an area uninhabitable. Once they have established 
a certain degree of territorial control through those atrocities, the perpetrators 
introduce a new type of war economy, in which “external flows, especially 
humanitarian assistance and remittances from abroad, are integrated into a local 
and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal trading” (Kaldor, 
2012: 94-113).  
These attributes of the “new wars” were first conceived by Kaldor in her 
personal observation of the Bosnian Civil War, and were later elaborated into a 
sophisticated theory through a comparative analysis of various conflicts in Asia 
and Africa. Thus, the concept was originally proposed as an ideal type - a standard 
for better understanding the nature of contemporary conflicts. The recent 
developments in the Middle East, however, urges us to consider its implications 
more seriously, as the emergence and rapid pervasion of ISIL appears to be a full 
embodiment of the ideal type of “new wars”4. 
ISIL became the focus of international media coverage after the fall of 
Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, on the night of 9 June 2014. The ensuing 
blitzkrieg over northern Iraq and Syria in the course of the summer alarmed world 
leaders, as the U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stressed that the group was, 
“beyond anything that we’ve seen”5. 
Contrary to the impression of an abrupt rise, created in the mainstream 
media, ISIL has a long history whose origins can be traced back almost fifteen 
years ago. The group was founded by a Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in 
1999. Zarqawi was a former Afghan jihadi and spent most of the 1990s in 
Jordanian prisons. Released in 1999, he made a short trip to Afghanistan, then 
came to Iraqi Kurdistan, where he set up his own camp. Subsequently, his group 
launched a series of attacks against Iraqi civilians and aid workers, making use of 
                                                 
4  The so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” has gone through numerous name changes since 
its inauguration in 1999. Originally it was known as Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād (JTJ: The 
Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), it changed to Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn 
(The Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers, or Al Qaeda in Iraq: AQI) in 
2004, then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, ISIL in 2013. On 29 June 2014, it took its latest 
moniker, the “Islamic State”.; Corbette (2014). 
5  “ISIS is 'beyond anything we have ever seen': Chuck Hagel warns terror network is an 'imminent 
threat to every interest we have”, see The Daily Mail Online, 21 Aug. 2014. 
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2004, then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, ISIL in 2013. On 29 June 2014, it took its latest 
moniker, the “Islamic State”.; Corbette (2014). 
5  “ISIS is 'beyond anything we have ever seen': Chuck Hagel warns terror network is an 'imminent 
threat to every interest we have”, see The Daily Mail Online, 21 Aug. 2014. 
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a variety of tactics – car bombings, suicide attacks, guerrilla raids, kidnappings, 
and so on. 
In the light of his Afghan connection, al-Zarqawi had, no doubt, ties with 
other “Afghan Arabs” and their network known as al-Qaeda, but al-Zarkawi’s 
Salafi-jihadi doctrines were different from those of al-Qaeda. Contrary to bin 
Laden and his successors, who underscore the fight against the West and envisage 
a “Caliphate state” in a future vision, al-Zarkawi’s group focused on urgently 
establishing an Islamist state and purging Muslim societies of “immorality and 
non-Islamic practices” (Saltman & Winter, 2014: 28). To justify attacks on 
Muslims, al-Zarkawi broadly stretched the notion of takfir (accusation of 
blasphemy) (Brachman, 2009: 45-6), and showed no mercy to his fellow Sunni 
Muslims if they did not give in. Even a reunion with al-Qaeda in 2004 did not 
change their attitude in pursuing their own jihadist agenda. After the death of Al-
Zarqawi, the group was led by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir in 2006. Shortly afterward, 
it adopted the new name of the “Islamic State in Iraq”. This symbolized the shift 
of its allegiance from al-Qaeda to their self-claimed emir, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. 
In 2011, his successor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, sent a detachment under the banner 
of the al-Nusra Front (NF) into Syria to fight against the Assad regime. When NF 
eventually grew more formidable than its parent organization, al-Baghdadi 
declared that Syria would be incorporated into his domain, now called ISIL, in 
April 2013. Subsequently, he moved to a northern Syrian city, Raqqa, and started 
building a permanent administrative structure. Since then, ISIL rapidly took the 
shape of a territorial state and annexed a wide swathe of land straddling the border 
between Syria and Iraq (Saltman & Winter, 2014: 29-0). 
The rapid growth of ISIL after 2013 is built upon two major pillars. First, it 
has succeeded in instigating internal chaos and instability by its systematic use of 
violence against the civilian population. The UN Commission’s report on the 
group’s atrocities in Syria is a good summary of these tactics: 
“With the capacity and means to attack the civilian population on a large 
scale, ISIS [sic.] has carried out mass victimization against civilians… ISIS 
has perpetrated murder and other inhumane acts, enslavement, rape, sexual 
slavery and violence, forcible displacement, enforced disappearance and 
torture. These acts have been committed as part of a widespread and 
systematic attack against the civilian population” (United Nations, 2014). 
The perpetration of violence  by ISIL has indeed been “deliberate and 
calculated”. Contrary to the propaganda image of ISIL as a bunch of bloodthirsty 
terrorists, disseminated by the western media, ISIL has a highly centralized 
command structure and is deploying its human and material resources according 
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to a well-elaborated overall plan.6 Their use of violence is not at all random; 
rather, it is selective and well-coordinated. They did it systematically, first to 
eliminate unwanted elements, then to segregate society, and eventually to 
consolidate their control over it. Having defeated the government forces in an 
area, ISIL would round up the population and sort out those who do not fit into 
their doctrines. Their first victim were Arab Christians. When they conquered 
certain cities or regions, ISIL would issue a statement demanding that the 
Christians either to convert to Islam, or, if not, pay the jizya (religious levy), leave 
the city, or be killed, as they did in Mosul in June 2014.7 The result was a mass 
exodus. The Christians that used to make up around 10% of Syrian population and 
7% of Iraqis have by now either been displaced or banished.8 No less tolerable 
treatment is awaiting Shiite Muslims. In the territory under ISIL, their fate was 
also either mass execution or expulsion. The case of Yazidis was more atrocious. 
As ISIL regards them as “Satan worshippers”, males were instantly killed, and 
women were sold as slaves (United Nations, 2014). 
Such discriminate use of violence has the effect of advancing the 
indoctrination of the group’s ideology among the rest of population. The rise of 
ISIL often created euphoria in the Sunni communities that had suffered from or 
born a grudge against Shiite domination. But the euphoria does not last long, as 
the imposition of strict Salafi norms is a disaster for most of them.9 Indeed, local 
tribes and local Sunni leaders never welcome ISIL, but to rebuff them is no easy 
job, as ISIL gives only two options to its opponents: beg for mercy or face certain 
death. For instance, dozens of members of the Sunni Albu Nimr tribe were 
slaughtered, as they took up arms against ISIL in Anbar in Iraq.10 In the same vein, 
ISIL unleashed mass executions of members of the Sheitaat clan that had refused 
to submit to them in the Deir-al-Zor province in Syria. The treatment of the 
Sheitaat was a powerful deterrent to resistance, and the other clans gave pledge of 
loyalty to ISIL.11 
Ethnic cleansing and exemplary execution is followed by the policy of 
“rendering an area uninhabitable”. Life under ISIL is nothing but “surveillance, 
coercion, fear and punishment” (United Nations, 2014). For most citizens, the 
main interaction with ISIL is with its ubiquitous police and security agencies, 
                                                 
6  “Significant threat to the entire region”, The Jordan News, 20 Aug. 2014. 
7  “Lights out for Christians in Mosul”, Human Events, 23 Jul. 2014. 
8  “For Arab Christians and secular Arab nationalists, Isis may be the death knell”, The Guardian, 23 
Jul, 2014. 
9  “Crisis in the Middle East: The end of a country, and the start of a new dark age”, The Independent, 
by Patrick Cockburn, 10 Aug. 2014. 
10  “Iraq on 'high alert' amid ISIS attacks, mass killings”, The Daily Star Lebanon, 3 Nov. 2014. 
11  “Islamic State turns radical Islam on Syria Muslims”, Reuters, 27 Aug. 2014. 
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including the Hesbah (religious police).12 In the territory under ISIL control, civil 
life is subjected to the strict rule of Islamic law, and the slightest breach of its 
ruling means harsh punishment. According to the UN investigation, “the group’s 
calculated use of public brutality to spread fear routinely includes public 
beheading, shooting and stoning of civilians and captured fighters”13. ISIL 
apparently deems brutality toward its people the key to stabilizing and 
consolidating their otherwise unbearable regime. As a jihadist ideologue, Abu 
Bakr Naji (2006: 11), puts it, “[In] a region submitting to the law of the jungle in 
its primitive form… people… yearn for someone to manage this savagery. They 
even accept any organization, regardless of whether it is made up of… evil 
people”. This is exactly what ISIL is doing. In other words, ISIL successfully 
imposes the harshest Islamist order only by pushing the region to the brink of total 
collapse, and rendering their rule an acceptable lesser evil. 
The second source of ISIL’s pervasion is its ability to manage the “war 
economy”. On one hand, ISIL subjugates civilians through terror. On the other 
hand, they indoctrinate and secure support by the provision of services to those 
who obey. In the conquered territories, ISIL tries to insinuate itself into every 
aspect of daily life by displaying its efficiency to govern. In its self-claimed 
“capital” of Raqqa, for instance, ISIL provides electricity and water, controls 
traffic, and runs nearly everything from bakeries and banks to schools, courts, and 
mosques. “Civilians have adjusted to the presence of the Islamic State, [not least] 
because they are doing institutional work”, one Raqqa resident reportedly said.14 
Likewise, ISIL has already separated military operations from civilian 
administration elsewhere, and has appointed civilian deputies called “walis” to 
take care of population. Administrative regions are divided into wilayehs 
(provinces) that sometimes span national boundaries. Fighters and employees 
receive a salary. Poor families, widows, orphans are given money.15 
To finance their “state”, ISIL has established a revenue system connecting 
asset transfers and extra-legal trading with external flows. ISIL seizes properties 
and real estate vacated by Christians and Shiites, and distributes them among its 
followers.16 They sell other illegal goods the group plunders from the land it 
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captures. ISIL also has taken in at least $20 million in ransom payments in 2014 
from kidnappings, and raises several million dollars per month through its 
extortion racket. The group has also imposed Islamic taxes on wealthy traders and 
families.17 The most important source of asset transfer is oil fields. ISIL sell oil for 
$30 a barrel in the black market through Turkey. U.S. intelligence claims ISIL is 
earning about $1 million a day just from black market oil sales.18  
The external flows for ISIL consists of a variety of sources: remittances 
from foreign donors; the massive arrival of foreign mercenaries; the export of oil, 
“slaves”, drugs, and other booty through smuggling routes; weapons and 
ammunition supplied by sponsor states (first of all from the USA); and 
international humanitarian aid. Attracted by the declaration of a “caliphate”, 
wealthy Islamists from across the world are sending money to Raqqa to support 
ISIL.19 ISIL’s media strategy, using online tools to circulate diverse propaganda, 
has helped make its presence felt among the world jihadist sympathizers. The 
group has developed its own smartphone apps and distinctive online messaging 
system, attracting thousands of “volunteers” from all over the world (Saltman & 
Winter, 2014: 9). ISIL’s territory is in the middle of the major trafficking route of 
Afghan heroin to the European market. Now, it is used to smuggle black market 
oil, “slaves”, and plundered goods. 
5. The U.S-led coalition: Another source of power for ISIL 
Washington and its allies have invested huge amount of weapons and 
equipment for Syrian opposition groups since 2011. As the Syrian military 
opposition is dominated by ISIL and NF in coalition with other extreme jihadi 
groups, the military aid almost automatically goes into the hand of ISIL. This is 
attested to by the fact that much of the ammunition used by ISIL was 
manufactured in the United States.20 Although the U.S administration asserts they 
made a distinction between extremists and “moderates”, in reality there is no 
dividing wall between the two. ISIL fighters have been trained by the U.S. 
military at a camp in Jordan in 2012 (Corbette, 2014). John McCain, chief 
propagator to better arm Syrian opposition groups, met and photographed with 
ISIL commanders in May 2013.21 So long as America continues to support its 
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supposedly “moderate” opposition allies, the external flow of arms into ISIL will 
not stop.22 
Further complexity lies in the context of humanitarian aid. Various Western 
aid agencies are providing assistance to poverty-stricken Syrians living in war-
torn regions. This includes areas under ISIL control. There, the U.S. funds 
healthcare clinics and provides blankets, plastic sheeting, and other items to 
enable the neediest citizens to weather the winter.23 Such seemingly unmilitary and 
genuinely humanitarian assistance has the function to prop up and buttress ISIL’s 
war economy, not least because it makes life under ISIL sustainable. 
The U.S.-led coalition’s air strikes pose the same kind of paradox. However 
precise it may be, the bombardment can’t avoid collateral damage to civilians. 
Especially so, as the ISIL fighters are mixed with non-combatants. The bereaved 
naturally harbor hatred against those who dropped bombs, and join ISIL for 
revenge. As a German journalist pointed out, “with every bomb that is dropped 
and hits a civilian, the number of terrorists increases”24. The logic, however, does 
not explain fully the negative effect of air strikes. The air strikes demolish the 
infrastructure, and make civil life more unbearable.25 The harsher living conditions 
become, the more solid ISIL's “management of savagery” becomes. Bombing 
fortifies ISIL’s grip over the population, rather than weakens its strength. 
This is just a part of the paradox the U.S.-led coalition is now confronting. 
As the coalition concentrates its efforts in Northern Syria and Iraq, the extremists 
are taking advantage of weak defenses  elsewhere. One of the most urgent foci is 
on Libya. Since the forcible elimination of the Qaddafi regime, the country has 
been devoid of any workable institution. There has been a complete destruction of 
the existing power equilibrium, which has brought about an all-out struggle 
among town-, tribe-, and militia-based networks (Wehrey & Lacher, 2014). 
Capitalizing on the chaos, a small number of former ISIL militants carved out an 
enclave for a “caliphate” around the Mediterranean city of Derna in October 2014. 
The group is now trying to expand their “model state” elsewhere.26 The threat is 
substantial, if one recalls the fact that a part of the umbrella organization of 
jihadists, known as the “al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb”, that has been a source of 
thousands of young fighters traveling from Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco to Syria 
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and Iraq, addressed loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.27 Nigerian extremists, “Boko 
Haram”, have now developed into a practical relationship with ISIL and are about 
to construct another “caliphate”28. Egypt’s Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a group that has 
waged an insurgency from its Sinai Peninsula base, likewise pledged its allegiance 
to ISIS.29 Barack Obama’s description of ISIL as a cancer describes their potential 
to fatally infect international security. In this way, ISIL-type threats are so 
seriously proliferating that the world at large has to confront them. 
6. International jihadism and the USA - “the sponsor state of 
terrorism” 
As our discussion hitherto implies, the U.S-led coalition can never 
exterminate ISIL-type threats. This is not least because air strikes and the 
empowerment of non-existent “moderate” opposition has limited effects, but 
because the Pentagon’s theory of national security can not cope with the new 
reality. Based on the old theory of “defense”, forged during the Cold War era, the 
U.S global strategy set state-based military threats as its main targets. So, it does 
not work in face of non-governmental extraterritorial armed threats. Moreover, 
and much more importantly, its sophisticated method of counter-intelligence and 
proxy war has hitherto proliferated, rather than prevented, ISIL-type terrorists. 
ISIL has long waged a campaign of terror against civilian targets to create 
irreparable instability. Their tactics of applying a “management of savagery”, 
however, had not yet paid off in 2011. The situation drastically changed with the 
U.S.-led covert intervention in the Syrian civil war. A huge number of foreign 
mercenaries, mostly jihadists, were recruited, equipped, trained, and smuggled 
into Syria by the U.S.-led sponsor states of rebels. The result was a state of chaos 
in the rebel-held territories, which has worked exclusively to the advantage of 
ISIL, as the group concentrated in subduing other rebel groups, deliberately 
avoiding open confrontation with governmental forces. In this sense, a recent 
comment from Andrey Klimov, the deputy head of the Russian Federation 
Council’s international affairs committee, hit the mark: “To a large extent, the 
U.S. is to blame for the formation of the IS [sic.] bandit group. Trying to topple 
SAR President Bashar Assad, Washington renders assistance, including military, 
to the Syrian opposition. Its former members and fighters of the so-called Free 
Syrian Army actively join the ranks of terrorists”30. As the Russian FM, Sergey 
Lavrov, puts it, “There is no such thing as a good terrorist”. The international 
community has to learn from the bitter lessons of the past and remind themselves 
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that no double standards are acceptable in the fight against terrorism.31 A recent 
CIA report corroborates the assertion by Lavrov, as it concluded that many past 
attempts by its agency to arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the 
long-term outcome of a conflict.32 Barack Obama, however, seems to be the last 
person to listen to the Russian advice. Under the pretext of fighting against ISIL, 
he has not only authorized the CIA to arm and train a total of 5,000 rebel soldiers 
per year in Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but also to ally with PKK, whom 
Washington had formally classified as “terrorists”33. So long as U.S. insist on the 
central role in the “war against terrorism”, the war is unlikely to cease. 
Moreover, a retrospective assessment of what they have done reveals the 
fact that the U.S administration has been the main abettor, if not the architect, of 
the global network of jihadists. Jihadism is a violent subcategory of the modern 
Islamism known as Salafism. Its origin dates back to the late nineteenth century, 
when a number of Muslim intellectuals, having become alarmed by the imperialist 
threat to their lands, discussed an alternative to the Western type of 
modernization, addressing the revival of an Islamic set of values, but without fully 
denying the nature of modernity. In other words, it sought a different path to 
modernity other than the Western colonialism. In the early twentieth century, 
however, the reformist movement took a puritanical turn to ancient Islam, relying 
on the Quran, Hadith, and Sunnah. In the following years, the Salafists developed 
their theory of Islamic puritanism and came to repudiate modernity as a whole 
(Brachman, 2009: 23-7). 
Thus, Salafism and the Western values the U.S. allegedly espouse are 
incompatible in every sense. The cooperation of these two alien principles, 
however, materialized in the course of the Afghan War in the 1980s, when the 
U.S. equipped and trained foreign fighters, mainly of Arab origin, to thwart Soviet 
attempts to restore its satellite state (Maley, 2009: 65-8). These “Afghan Arabs” 
came to constitute the core of the extreme Islamist group subsequently known as 
al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda, at its initial stage, was more like a philanthropist 
organization than an international jihadist network. By the mid-1990s, the group 
had been largely dormant, consisting of no more than thirty core members 
(Saltman & Winter, 2014: 15-6). The crucial turning point came when the 
Bosnian Civil War broke out in 1992. Since then, al-Qaeda entrenched itself 
deeply in the Balkans and from this stronghold the group constructed a wide 
network encompassing Western Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 
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The Balkans is now one of the major recruiting points and trafficking routes 
of ISIL fighters. It is estimated more than one thousand jihadists of the Balkans 
origin are now fighting in ISIL.34 Their main recruit centers are such cities like 
Sarajevo, Prishtina, Prizren, and Novi Pazar. These centers are surrounded by a 
network of smaller towns and villages, scattered over the Muslim-populated 
countryside, and spreading over several countries. Novi Pazar, for instance, is at 
the center of a land bridge through the porous border running across the Serbian 
southern regions, connecting Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia, with Montenegro, and 
from there to Italy (Michaeletos, 2015). The fighters recruited in those centers 
were first sent to training camps in Europe, like Vienna, or in the Middle East, 
through channels affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and are then smuggled 
into Syria and Iraq.35 
The Balkans' jihadist networks are key to the illicit arms and narco-
trafficking from the Caucasus to Western Europe. The major heroin trafficking 
route, for instance, is running through Turkey, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Bosnia. The 
rapid increase in the number of refugees widened the business chances for the 
jihadist human traffickers. In the last two years, for instance, the Bulgarian 
national security witnessed a drastic rise in the number of illegal immigrants, 
mainly from Syria and Afghanistan.36 They are brought by jihadist-connected 
agencies, and terrorists enter Bulgaria as a part of the refugee wave.37 
Although the Balkans is home to the largest indigenous Muslim population 
in Europe, this new form of extreme Islam is brand new, and completely alien to 
their traditional beliefs. Historically, Islam in the Balkans has been well integrated 
into the local multi-ethnic and religious cultures, and are characterized by a high 
degree of syncretism (Sahara, 2008). 
The origins of the recent militant Islamist movement in Southeastern Europe 
are directly tied to a controversial person, the former Bosnian president, Alija 
Izetbegović. An al-Azhar graduate, Izetbegović was a sworn Salafist, the author of 
the “Islamic Declaration”, a pamphlet openly propagating to establish an Islamic 
state in the Balkans (Sahara, 1994: 386-7). He was arrested several times for his 
commitment to extremist propaganda (Sahara, 1994: 386-7). Albeit these stained 
records, his government was strongly backed by the U.S. administration of Bill 
Clinton, and the support opened the doors for the proliferation of Muslim 
extremists during the Yugoslav disintegration in the 1990s (Bardos, 2014). 
Izetbegović, with the help of Washington, invited Afghan-trained mujahideen into 
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the Balkans in 1992 as mercenaries of the paramilitary units subordinated to his 
“Party of Democratic Action” (Hoare, 2004: 131-3). The advent of mujahideen on 
European soil brought about a pivotal change for the course of war in Bosnia in 
particular, and for the proliferation of the global jihadist movement in general. 
Their initial number was no more than a few hundred, and seldom contributed to 
the Bosnian army’s war efforts against the Serb and Croat rebels. The mujahideen 
were usually stationed at the Muslim stronghold in the central Bosnia, and mainly 
engaged in the intimidation of Bosnian Muslim populations. The number 
subsequently increased and reached around 6,000 in 1995, but their military 
contribution remained minimal. Although some of them were sent to the front, it 
only resulted in the increase of war atrocities, for example the rampant killing of 
Christian civilian population, often by means of beheadings, which tarnished the 
image forged by the U.S. media of the Bosnian Muslim government (Schindler, 
2007).  
The real effect of the deployment of mujahideen, thus, was the establishment 
of the European branches of Al-Qaeda, centering on the Balkans. For this purpose, 
Osama bin Laden visited the Balkans on three occasions between 1994 and 1996 
(Schindler, 2007). His right-hand man, an Egyptian, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, had 
opened major terrorist training camps in Zenica and Kosovska Mitrovica by 1994. 
They were connected with a number of weapons depots and factories secretly 
built in many Muslim villages in and around Bosnia. He was also operating 
money-laundering and drug-trading networks throughout Albania, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia. Al-Qaeda’s command-and-control 
centers were further established in Croatia and Tetovo (Macedonia), as well as 
around Sofia (Bulgaria) (Schindler, 2007). The work of bin-Laden and Zawahiri 
was closely supported and protected by the Bosnian Muslim government and its 
patrons in Washington. The Bosnian Embassy in Vienna, for instance, issued a 
passport to bin Laden in 1993. The Sarajevo government gave Bosnian 
citizenships or issued journalists' credentials and aid workers’ licenses, to the 
Muslim fighters from Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and 
others, with the intention to obscure the illegal use of foreign mercenaries. The 
U.S. agents of the CIA and NSA collaborated and even gave them IDs of various 
UN-affiliated missions (Schindler, 2007). It is clear that these acts of aggression 
against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic's being embraced by Milosevic 
and Tudjman, and the failure of international actors to find a solution to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina all provided the best opportunity for jihadis to find the fertile 
ground and flourish. 
After the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, the infrastructure supporting 
jihadist activities continued and was further consolidated in the Balkans, as the 
foreign Islamist mercenaries, many of whom were now rewarded with Bosnian 
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passports, merged with domestic elements, settled in the villages, and developed a 
network of extra-territorial, sharia-run enclaves around the Balkans. It served as 
the entrepôt of extremists joining jihads in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Yemen 
(Kohlmann, 2004: 162-163; Bardos, 2014). 
The Kosovo crisis of 1998 helped further fortify the Balkan jihadist grounds. 
Starting as an extreme leftist resistance movement to the Serbian occupation of 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army merged with the Balkan jihadist network 
after 1996 (Sahara, 2004: 359-2; Taylor, 2002). Bin Laden visited Albania in 1996 
and 1997. During the Bosnian war, the jihadists had set up several training camps 
in Albania, including the one built on the personal property of former Albanian 
premier Sali Berisha in Tropje. The Albanian movement in Kosovo was formally 
declared as a "jihad" in October 1998 at an annual international Islamic 
conference in Pakistan.38 The KLA profited from the network not only in terms of 
their weapons and fighters, but also as it was an enormous source of income. The 
KLA and their jihadist collaborators were widely engaged in international drug 
smuggling, human trafficking, and the kidnapping of Serb citizens to sell their 
organs in the European black market (Shay, 2009: 87-91; Zejneli & Janćević, 
2011: 53-76). Washington was the middleman here, as it was in Bosnia. By early 
1998, the U.S. had already established a direct relationship with the KLA. Well 
into the summer of 1999, KLA continued to receive official NATO/U.S. arms and 
training support and diplomatic back-ups.39 
As a result of these wars, the jihadists have deeply entrenched themselves 
throughout the western Balkans, and their influence is posing a serious threat to 
Bulgaria (Bardos, 2014). There is an estimate that between five and ten percent of 
Balkan Muslims have already become indoctrinated with an extreme form of 
Islam. The former chief mufti in Bulgaria, Nedim Gendzhev, expressed deep 
anxiety about the militant Islamists' infiltration into the western Rhodope 
Mountains, and warned that a “fundamentalist triangle” was about to be formed 
that would connect Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria (Bardos, 2014). His concern 
is not at all ungrounded. The traditional Balkan Muslim culture is now in great 
danger.40 With an enormous inflow of funds from generous Middle Eastern 
donors, Islamists have created a sophisticated infrastructure.41 The new generation 
of Balkan Muslim clerics, educated in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are operating a 
number of mosques and schools in the countryside. There are a lot of Salafi 
villages, serving as hotbeds for radical youth led by extremist clergies. The 
Salafists are now in possession of a wide array of electronic and print media 
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was closely supported and protected by the Bosnian Muslim government and its 
patrons in Washington. The Bosnian Embassy in Vienna, for instance, issued a 
passport to bin Laden in 1993. The Sarajevo government gave Bosnian 
citizenships or issued journalists' credentials and aid workers’ licenses, to the 
Muslim fighters from Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and 
others, with the intention to obscure the illegal use of foreign mercenaries. The 
U.S. agents of the CIA and NSA collaborated and even gave them IDs of various 
UN-affiliated missions (Schindler, 2007). It is clear that these acts of aggression 
against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic's being embraced by Milosevic 
and Tudjman, and the failure of international actors to find a solution to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina all provided the best opportunity for jihadis to find the fertile 
ground and flourish. 
After the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, the infrastructure supporting 
jihadist activities continued and was further consolidated in the Balkans, as the 
foreign Islamist mercenaries, many of whom were now rewarded with Bosnian 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 317 
 
passports, merged with domestic elements, settled in the villages, and developed a 
network of extra-territorial, sharia-run enclaves around the Balkans. It served as 
the entrepôt of extremists joining jihads in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Yemen 
(Kohlmann, 2004: 162-163; Bardos, 2014). 
The Kosovo crisis of 1998 helped further fortify the Balkan jihadist grounds. 
Starting as an extreme leftist resistance movement to the Serbian occupation of 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army merged with the Balkan jihadist network 
after 1996 (Sahara, 2004: 359-2; Taylor, 2002). Bin Laden visited Albania in 1996 
and 1997. During the Bosnian war, the jihadists had set up several training camps 
in Albania, including the one built on the personal property of former Albanian 
premier Sali Berisha in Tropje. The Albanian movement in Kosovo was formally 
declared as a "jihad" in October 1998 at an annual international Islamic 
conference in Pakistan.38 The KLA profited from the network not only in terms of 
their weapons and fighters, but also as it was an enormous source of income. The 
KLA and their jihadist collaborators were widely engaged in international drug 
smuggling, human trafficking, and the kidnapping of Serb citizens to sell their 
organs in the European black market (Shay, 2009: 87-91; Zejneli & Janćević, 
2011: 53-76). Washington was the middleman here, as it was in Bosnia. By early 
1998, the U.S. had already established a direct relationship with the KLA. Well 
into the summer of 1999, KLA continued to receive official NATO/U.S. arms and 
training support and diplomatic back-ups.39 
As a result of these wars, the jihadists have deeply entrenched themselves 
throughout the western Balkans, and their influence is posing a serious threat to 
Bulgaria (Bardos, 2014). There is an estimate that between five and ten percent of 
Balkan Muslims have already become indoctrinated with an extreme form of 
Islam. The former chief mufti in Bulgaria, Nedim Gendzhev, expressed deep 
anxiety about the militant Islamists' infiltration into the western Rhodope 
Mountains, and warned that a “fundamentalist triangle” was about to be formed 
that would connect Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria (Bardos, 2014). His concern 
is not at all ungrounded. The traditional Balkan Muslim culture is now in great 
danger.40 With an enormous inflow of funds from generous Middle Eastern 
donors, Islamists have created a sophisticated infrastructure.41 The new generation 
of Balkan Muslim clerics, educated in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are operating a 
number of mosques and schools in the countryside. There are a lot of Salafi 
villages, serving as hotbeds for radical youth led by extremist clergies. The 
Salafists are now in possession of a wide array of electronic and print media 
                                                 
38  “Al Qaeda's Balkan Links”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 1 Nov. 2001. 
39  “Al Qaeda's Balkan Links”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 1 Nov. 2001. 
40  “Džihadisti upali u sarajevsku džamiju”, RTS, 23 Jan. 2015. 
41  “Albanian expert: Turkey waypoint for Balkan jihadists”, Today’s Zaman, 19 Jul. 2014. 
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propagating various jihadist ideals. Their efforts are supported and implemented 
through a network of “NGOs”, “charities” and “humanitarian aid” organizations, 
active in southeastern Europe. The CIA has estimated that one-third of the 
Bosnian NGOs operating worldwide have terrorist connections or employ people 
with terrorist links (Bardos, 2014).  
This development obscures the distinction between the moderate Islam 
traditionally practiced in the Balkans and the extreme and violent forms imported 
from elsewhere. Over the past decade, militant Islamists of the Balkans have been 
involved in numerous actions and conspiracies in and outside the region, 
including the attacks of 11 September 2001 attacks and the November 2008 
Mumbai bombings. Most recently, a young man from Kosovo became “the 
Balkans’ first suicide bomber”, killing fifty people in an attack in Baghdad in 
March 2014. As mentioned above, ISIL’s advance in Syria and Iraq in the summer 
of 2014 brought about a renewed upsurge of militant jihadism in the region 
(Bardos, 2014). 
Alarmed by the development, Balkan states are launching efforts to clamp 
down on the jihadists. Earlier in September 2014, the Bosnian police arrested 16 
people on charges of abetting jihadists to fight in Syria and Iraq. In Kosovo, some 
55 Islamists were arrested on similar grounds. The Bulgarian authorities 
announced that Ahmed Musa Ahmed, a Muslim spiritual leader in 
the Roma neighborhood of Pazardhik, and his followers were arrested on 
charges of extolling the ideology of ISIL. To assist with the crackdown, 
governments are busy amending their existing criminal codes. In April 2014, 
Bosnia passed a law giving prison terms of up to ten years to convicted Islamists 
and their recruiters. Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia are considering amendments 
to their criminal codes to make it punishable to fight abroad.42 Given the political 
disunity in the region, however, their efforts lacked coherence and coordination, 
and it is unlikely they can stem the extremist threat by themselves. 
Al-Qaeda’s second springboard was Chechnya. When the first Chechen War 
of independence broke out in December 1994, Ibn Hattab, an al-Qaeda 
commander of Jordanian origin, came to the Caucasus with a small number of 
jihadists. As in Bosnia, jihadists did not contribute militarily to the cause of the 
Chechens. There were no more than 300 foreign jihadists in 1995 (Chaudet, 2009: 
39). Their presence, however, drastically transformed Chechen nationalism. 
Al-Qaeda introduced Salafist doctrines to Chechnya, and here the roles of 
radical Muslims of U.S. origin were crucial (Bogdansky, 2007: 146). The United 
States has been financing militant Chechen groups through “civil society” 
                                                 
42  “Balkans launch fight against jihadist recruitment”, The Daily Star, 1 Oct, 2014; “Bulgaria Charges 
Seven with Promoting Islamic State, Propagating War”, Novinite.com, 27 Nov. 2014. 
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organizations with overt and covert links with the NSA, CIA, and other 
governmental organs. The U.S. State Department and intelligence agencies 
provide Chechen jihadists with diplomatic protection and moral support by 
orchestrating media propaganda (Madsen, 2013). It helped the Jihadists to 
infiltrate into Chechnya and other northern Caucasus regions. 
Although Chechens are Muslims, orthodox Sunni Islam did not occupy a 
central place in the collective identity. Chechen nationalism is a secular one based 
on language, a distinct culture, and tradition. Tragic historical memories, such as 
harsh reprisal to the followers of Imam Shamil by Tsarist Russia and the mass 
deportation during the Stalinist era, are a much stronger national bond than 
religion. Moreover, the traditional Chechen Islam is Sufism, thus orthodox Sunni 
norms were little revered (Sokirianskaia, 2010: 101-11). 
The original liberation fighters of Chechnya were, therefore, either 
nationalists or pan-Caucasian federalists, little inclined to religious extremism. 
During, and especially after, the war, some of them accepted Salafism for 
pragmatic reasons. The case of Shamil Basaev, the main warlord in Chechnya, 
was a good example. Originally a secular pan-Caucasian nationalist, Basaev 
became a jihadist, not because of a real conversion to radical Islamism, but due to 
military realism. He realized the utility of the link with international jihadists in 
terms of its financial, military, and propagandist resources. To outwit his political 
rival, Aslan Maskhadov, Basaev allied with the jihadists, and gave them 
opportunities to infiltrate Chechen soil (Chaudet, 2009: 43-4). With the help of 
Basaev, foreign jihadists settled in Chechnya, took charge of training Chechen 
troops, and disseminated Salafist doctrines in tandem with the radical clerics 
coming from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, creating a deep rift inside the society 
(Akaev, 2010: 69-77; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006: 110-1). The outbreak of a 
second war in 1999 came as the fatal blow to secular Chechen nationalists, as 
Moscow annihilated their forces mercilessly. The result was the jihadists’ take-
over of the Chechen resistance leadership (Zürcher, 2007: 89-97). 
After the second war, Chechen resistance has been neutralized by the pro-
Moscow regime of the Kadyrovs. The jihadists, therefore, shifted their main field 
of activities to outside of Chechnya. They allied with other extremists in the 
former USSR and committed various terrorist acts, including suicide attacks 
(Hahn, 2007: 92-3). They are playing crucial roles in the recent advance of ISIL. 
According to Russia's Federal Security Service, as many as 500 militants from 
Russia and hundreds more from other ex-Soviet nations are fighting in Syria. The 
presence of Chechens is outstanding among them. They are regarded as the best 
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fighters in the rank and file of the ISIL forces, and the most feared for their 
extreme brutality.43 
Our brief look at the past records attest that the U.S. administration has been 
pursuing a consistent policy to use Jihadists as a tool to subvert the regimes of its 
ideological enemies – Communists, ex-Communists, and Arab Socialists. It has 
empowered Jihadists in various ways, including financial and military assistance, 
diplomatic protection, and morale support with mass-media propaganda. In this 
regard, one can safely conclude that the U.S. has been the main “sponsor state of 
terrorism”. 
One can notice several common features in the Balkans and Caucasus, two 
of the main springboards of international jihadism. First, both of the regions had 
been ruled by communists and were largely secularized and de-Islamized by the 
end of the regime. Like other religious institutions, the communist authorities 
controlled Islam through official channels such as the chief mufti offices. It 
rendered the “official” Islam something alien to ordinary Muslims. On the other 
hand, there existed “popular” Islam embodied in various forms of custom and 
traditional culture. As a rule, “popular” Islam is a product of locality and shows a 
strong tendency of syncretism. After the fall of the communist regime, both forms 
of Islam were rebuffed by the new generation who sought spiritual salvation 
instead of Marxist materialism. They were partly attracted by Salafism, deeming 
it, wrongly, as a true path to religious belief (Hahn, 2007: 12-3). Second, both 
regions were economically hard hit. Due to a lack of domestic resources, 
religious-minded people welcomed external donations, especially from Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi money helped build mosques and madrassas through which 
Salafism was disseminated (Yemelianova, 2010: 26-29; Schindler, 2007: 261-
271). Third, the Balkans and Caucasus were divided into small states as a result of 
the fall of the socialist federal system. Newly formed states have long suffered 
from poor governance: the bureaucracy is corrupt, the police are disorganized, the 
intelligence is unsophisticated, and their borders are porous. These factors created 
the optimum soil for a proliferation of trans-border criminal groups. Fourth, the 
two regions have come through several military conflicts, and a huge inflow of 
weapons and ammunition has been a corollary fact. All of these enabled otherwise 
trivial jihadist terrorists to become deeply entrenched into society. 
 
 
                                                 
43  “Chechen Isis fighters under Omar al-Shishani threaten to take fight to Putin”, The Independent, 10 
Oct. 2014; “The face of evil”, The Daily Mail Lebanon, 29 Jul. 2014. 
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7. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the 
international Jihadist threat 
There is another region that had all aforementioned attributes: Central Asia. 
Since their independence, the Central Asian countries have faced a dire, and even 
more substantial, threat posed by Islamist/jihadi militant groups than that in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus. With ties across a wider region, including Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, they are formidable enemies that no country can ward off alone. In 
Uzbekistan, a number of Islamic radical organizations appeared mainly in the 
Ferghana Valley seeking to establish a Caliphate during the 1990s. Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, too, are facing the danger of Islamic extremist parties. Kazakhstan 
is trying to control the activity of Uyghur separatists. The main protagonist of 
those extremists is the al-Qaeda affiliated group known as “Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan” (IMU). In 1999, IMU militants crossed from their bases in 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan’s Batken province, and clashed with 
Kyrgyz troops. Subsequently, they made a series of terrorist attacks against the 
government of Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2003). Since then, IMU has committed 
sporadic but incessant attacks all over Central Asia. In 2002, several bombs were 
planted and exploded in market places in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In July 
2004, IMU attacked the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. More attacks 
occurred in cross-border areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the Ferghana 
Valley in 2006 and 2007 (Tolipov, 2006: 166). IMU has cooperated with another 
extremist group, Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The group was associated with the events in 
Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005 when an assault by a militant Islamic group led 
to an uprising that merged with wider socioeconomic discontent, and its brutal 
repression by government troops (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008: 2). 
Capitalizing on the porous border and transnational ethnic, tribal, and 
kinship ties, IMU and its allies freely trespassed on various public and civil targets 
in the Central Asian countries. Faced with the common threat, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the treaty “On Joint Actions in 
Fighting Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, and Transnational 
Organized Crime” on 21 April 2000. Though it mostly remained on the 
declaratory level, this treaty laid the foundation for a regional approach to 
counter–terrorism.44 The initiative of Central Asian countries, in due course, 
merged with a similar endeavor undertaken by China. 
                                                 
44  The Treaty stipulated the following points: (1) a harmonization of national legislations for 
counteracting terrorism and other forms of extremism and transnational organized crime; (2) the 
development and realization of practical measures for preventing the territory of Central Asia to 
become a breeding ground for terrorist bases; (3) the exchange of information about crimes and 
suspected persons and organizations involved in them and terrorist activity; and (4) the execution of 
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Beijing has long been struggling with terrorist threats emanating from 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, first of all from the extremist “East 
Turkestan Islamic Movement”. Its anxiety eventually led to the creation of a 
regional multilateral forum known as the Shanghai Five on 26 April 1996. Russia, 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan agreed on the necessity to address 
their common issues formulated as the “three evils”: terrorism, religious 
extremism, and secessionism. In June 2001, with the admission of Uzbekistan, the 
Shanghai Five transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
“Shanghai Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism” was 
signed (Chung, 2006: 3). The SCO was further institutionalized by the adaptation 
of its charter, composed of twenty-six articles, at a meeting in St. Petersburg in 
June 2002. 
As defined in its charter, the SCO’s main purpose is “working together to 
maintain regional peace, security and stability”. So its priority is the containment 
of Islamist rebel groups capable of acts of terror over the region (Fredholm, 2013: 
4). To address the threat, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was 
established in June 2004. Starting as a “hub of information exchange” and an 
analytical center, the RATS was initially not meant to have an operational role. Its 
staffing at the headquarters in Tashkent was very modest, made up of only thirty 
officials, including seven Chinese, seven Russians and sixteen Central Asians. 
Subsequently its competence was extended. In 2005, it was decided to expand the 
role of RATS to the coordination of investigations, anti-terrorist operations, and 
anti-terrorist exercises, as well as to the training of specialists. The Shanghai 
summit in 2006 attached high priority to the further expansion of RATS’ 
capabilities (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008: 13-4). 
The tendency for fruitful cooperation within SCO regarding the containment 
of jihadist threat is obvious. So far, member states have been successful in 
combating terrorism within their own jurisdiction without outside help. For 
instance, over 250 terror attacks were pre-empted in 2005. IMU and Hizb-ut-
Tahrir, besides al-Qaeda, are listed as terror organizations in all of the SCO's 
member states. Moreover, about 400 suspected terrorists are on the Agency’s 
wanted list. By close exchange of intelligence information and coordinated 
crackdown against the terrorists’ cells, the SCO has displayed the effectiveness of 
regional cooperation in the battle against the international jihadism (Tolipov, 
2006: 168). 
Effective policing is just a part of the function that the SCO has performed 
in its battle against the “three evils”. In parallel with the development of RATS, 
                                                                                                                                 
joint special operations of competent agencies against terrorists and other criminals. See Tolipov 
(2006: 154-5). 
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the SCO has conducted a series of military exercises since 2002, and their size and 
proportion are gathering momentum. The joint show of force is a strong deterrent 
message to terrorists. Although Western observers see in them the sign that the 
SCO will be a military alliance, their speculation is groundless and disregards 
reality (Hongxi, 2013: 139; Germanovich, 2008: 38). It is true that the SCO’s 
mandate includes cooperation on security matters, such as measures to combat 
illicit proliferation of conventional weapons and the establishment of a rapid 
reaction capacity to regional crises; however, it does not have a mandate for 
peacekeeping (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008: 4). The SCO is an inter-
governmental rather than supra-national organization that involves little surrender 
of state sovereignty and, so far, there is no sight it will grow into a collective 
security body. 
As made it clear by the Dushanbe Declaration on 5 July 2000, the SCO 
confirmed the right of each state to choose its own path of political, economic, 
and public policy development, condemned intervention into the internal affairs of 
other states under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” and “human rights 
protection”, and supported efforts by member states to protect the independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social stability (Chung, 2006: 8-9). From a 
military point of view, therefore, the SCO takes the form of a non-aggression pact 
of mutual recognition of sovereignty based on non-intervention principles, rather 
than acting as an alliance based on certain shared values. These pragmatic 
principles not only enable effective cooperation among the states with different 
types of regimes, but also created mutual confidence among them. “In the 
framework of the Shanghai Five – SCO”, a Chinese researcher maintains, “all the 
disputes regarding the western section of the formerly Sino-Soviet border of more 
than three thousand kilometer, which had bred instability and conflicts for 
centuries, were completely solved in eight years” (Guang, 2013: 20-1). 
The success of SCO in the “battle against terrorism” shows that a coalition 
built for practical purposes is more effective in the fight against the jihadists than 
internationally coordinated actions based on shared values. Jihadists are the kind 
of people who openly declare: “All moderate Muslims who promote democracy, 
should be killed. Because they promote human laws over the laws of God”.45 
Against such an enemy, the normative constrains based on Western-style 
democratic values have little effect. Rather, they provide the perpetrators with a 
kind of shield against governmental or interregional forces, not least because the 
latter are required to abide by the codes. It is attested by recent findings that rebels 
are more violent in democratic countries than in authoritarian regimes (Eck & 
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and says they want to ‘kill all non-believers and enslave their children”, Daily Mail Online, 23 Dec. 
2014. 
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Hultman, 2007: 244). The past records, likewise, show that effective policing is 
much more useful in containing the terrorist threats.46 
It is true that a police state is no welcome thing, but suspension of certain 
elements of civil rights and extrajudicial procedures seem to be necessary to 
contain the Salafist-jihadist threats. Even Western countries have already 
disrupted their civic values by introducing controversial measures that interfere ex 
post facto principle, such as preventive detention, conspiracy, and inchoate 
offense. It has the potential to destroy the major principles of Western civil 
society. To resolve the dilemma, one can find a model in the judicial measures 
against the glorification of Nazism or against the dissemination of anti-Semite 
discourses. 
The dilemma of civil principles in the “battle against terrorism” has further 
connotations. Such discourses as “humanitarian intervention” must be strictly 
scrutinized. As a number of cases including recent events in Libya, Iraq, and Syria 
have shown us, international jihadism has grown especially rampant by 
capitalizing on the U.S. policy of covert intervention into its unwanted regimes, 
taking “human rights abuses” as a pretext. So long as the practice is left intact, an 
effective fight against terrorism can not be expected. In this regard, there is 
another merit in the SCO. While a single state is vulnerable to the external 
pressure of “democratic change”, a coalition can display more resilience. One of 
the impressive examples was the SCO’s successful elimination of U.S. bases in 
2005. When the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan started, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan provided air bases for U.S. military. Russia and China, likewise, saw 
in the U.S. an ally in combating terrorism and religious extremism. The U.S., 
however, was reluctant to evacuate the air bases after the fall of Taliban 
government. Moreover, the so-called “Tulip Revolution” of Kyrgyzstan and 
subsequent Western criticisms of Islam Karimov for the violent crackdown of an 
uprising in Andijan of May 2005 led to an anxiety shared among SCO leaders. 
They suspected the U.S. was engaging in covert operations to subvert the 
incumbent regimes in Central Asia. Reflecting the mood, the Astana summit in 
2005 called for U.S to pull out from airbases. The request was materialized by the 
end of year, something that would have been unrealistic if it were the endeavor of 
a single government (Bin, 2013: 56-7). In contrast to the Middle East, the 
Balkans, and the Caucasus cases, where U.S. covert intervention by means of the 
Islamist proxies has been the major source of proliferation of international 
                                                 
46  According to the Global Terrorism Index 2014, since the 1960s, 83% of terrorist organizations ceased 
to operate due to policing or the initiation of a political process. On the other hand, full military 
intervention eliminated only 7% of them. See Institute for Global Economics and Peace, Global 
Terrorism Index 2014, www.economicsandpeace.org 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 325 
 
jihadism, the SCO’s successful efforts to ward off the U.S. threats to Central Asia 
has produced stabilizing effects in the region. 
The third and seemingly most enduring deterrent effect of the SCO against 
international jihadism is its economic cooperation. The SCO has realized that 
poverty is one of the major sources of instability and extremism in Central Asia 
and Xinjiang province. Since the 2003 Moscow summit, the SCO has expanded to 
embrace economic cooperation in the form of encouraging trade, investment, and 
infrastructure development among members. Next year, the organization decided 
to establish five specialized working groups in the areas of commerce, customs, 
quality inspection, investment promotion, and transportation. The function was 
further consolidated by the creation of the SCO Development Fund in 2006 
(Chung, 2006: 9). 
Thanks to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the transformation of 
the SCO from an anti-terrorist police union to an institutionalized economic 
confederation has hitherto been successful. Beijing’s move away from dollar-
denominated assets such as U.S. Treasury bonds and the expansion of the scope of 
its investment targets, including infrastructure and property projects abroad, 
helped a great deal in the development of the region.47 China was especially active 
in its regional diplomacy in 2014, including the inauguration of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “Silk Road Fund”. If the SCO will secure 
a new economic structure in the region, it will mitigate the hardship of a broad 
swath of people who have hitherto been excluded from globalization. 
The successful records of the SCO imply that regional cooperation based on 
practical purposes, rather than shared values, can play a more effective role in 
fighting against the international jihadist threat than a military coalition led by the 
“world super power”. The SCO was born as an adhoc union of countries that 
shared a common concern over the trans-border activities of jihadists. The 
cooperation started as an exchange of intelligence among a handful of officers. 
Although it subsequently embraced joint military maneuvers, it never developed 
into a military alliance, nor mounted joint military actions. The moderate efforts, 
however, brought about conspicuous stability in the region. The reason behind its 
success lies in the member states' realization of the benefit of mutually 
recognizing the difference of regimes, and their agreement not to intervene into 
the others' internal affairs. It enabled the consolidation of governmental control 
over their territory, the stability of their international borders, and the effective 
policing against terrorists within the jurisdictions of each state. The cooperation 
subsequently enlarged the spheres of cooperation into concerted diplomacy and 
economic ties. It eventually reduced the margins in which the sponsor states of 
                                                 
47  “A friend in need during hard times”, People’s Daily, 23 Dec. 2014. 
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terrorism could meddle, and enlarged the possibility of economic development 
from within. 
8. Conclusions 
The abrupt expansion of ISIL has changed the worldview of modern Islamist 
terrorism drastically. As the Quilliam report warns us, “we are in the throes of 
great shifts to the jihadist status quo that will have profound international 
geopolitical consequences” (Saltman & Winter, 2014: 7). Some may imagine a 
further jihadist upsurge that would eventually embrace huge swathes of Muslim 
regions. Such a scenario is actually unlikely, as the ratio of jihadists is very small 
in the total Muslim population in the world. The author’s assessment of the future 
geopolitical shifts is quite different. 
Instead, possible geopolitical shifts will result from the initiatives of nation 
states that are threatened by extremists. As the new threats are the products of the 
gradual erosion of nation state and more closely resemble criminality than 
political opposition, the restoration of effective policing and the state’s role in 
economic redistribution and social welfare are much more effective remedies to 
the malady than are concerted military actions. Taking into account the growing 
pressures of globalization, the restoration of the nation state has to be done on the 
basis of regional cooperation. As the case study of SCO attests, regionally based 
permanent anti-terrorist cooperation is a strong deterrent against extremism. In 
other words, the key to eliminate the extremist threat is a well-coordinated 
security and economic partnership among neighboring states. Recent 
developments in other parts of the world support this reasoning. In December 
2013, a BRICS senior security officials’ meeting agreed to take steps toward 
forming a standing expert body to fight against “terrorism, extremism, and 
radicalism” in Cape Town.48 Recent initiatives to create an Arab Action force will 
be another example.49 
The development of SCO as an economic framework suggests to us the 
possibility of further geopolitical shifts regional cooperation can bring about. Due 
to the U.S.-led sanctions on the pretext of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been 
forced to make a pivotal shift to the East. Although China and Russia have 
                                                 
48  “Senior BRICS officials discuss international security in Cape Town”, Itar-Tass, 9 Dec. 2013. 
49  Secret talks between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are underway to 
create a military pact to fight against Islamic militants. It is motivated by the threats emanating from 
Libya and Yemen. “Arab allies hold secret talks on joint action against militants”, The Independent, 4 
Nov. 2014. In the same vein, Fouad Siniora, former PM of Lebanon, and Amr Moussa, former 
secretary-general of the Arab League, jointly proposed to take steps to expand “the concept of a joint 
Arab defense body… a joint Arab force on land, sea and in the air that protects peace and deters 
threats to the whole Arab region”. See “The dangerous disintegration of Yemen”, The Daily Star 
Lebanon, 13 Nov. 2014. 
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merged their long-term objectives in a strategic partnership since 1996, they are 
less cooperative in economic terms. Moscow’s inclination to the Western market 
and several incompatibilities over Central Asia retarded their economic 
cooperation. Since SCO took a turn toward acting as an economic confederation, 
however, Moscow realized the profit it can expect from it. Western sanctions have 
precipitated the process, and the two countries now share common interests in 
non-western economic and financial schemes.50 
The Russo-Chinese rapprochement has further implications for structural 
changes in the global economy. Led by these two powers, Brazil, India, and South 
Africa have taken a decisive step to create their own currency union. The sixth 
BRICS summit agreed on the establishment of the New Development Bank and 
the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014. Although 
it is uncertain whether NDB-CRA will eventually grow into an alternative to the 
dollar-dominated IMF-WB system, the potential is enormous, as the BRICS 
account for almost 30% of world GDP and for about 45% of the world population. 
As Indian PM Narendra Modi remarked, the NDB and the CRA signal the group’s 
collective capacity to create and manage global institutions.51 
Another impact of Russo-Chinese rapprochement is the initiative to enlarge 
the membership of SCO. The group’s Dushanbe summit in September 2014 
adopted the amendment of its charter to enable new enrollments. According to 
Sergei Lavrov, India, Pakistan, and Iran are the most probable candidates.52 If one 
takes into account that the three have serious concerns over the interior threats of 
jihadists, the plan is not at all unrealistic. If they become permanent members, the 
SCO will control twenty percent of the oil and half of the gas reserves in the 
world. Moreover, the bloc will be home to about half of the world’s population. 
The BRICS currency union and the enlarged SCO will mark the decisive 
turning point from the so-called “unipolar” system of post-Cold War to the multi-
polar global order. The multi-polar economic system will have, in theory, 
mitigating effects to the rigid financial and monetary policies imposed by the 
“Washington consensus”. It will ameliorate the austerity measures that have 
precipitated sharp economic stratification. If multi-polarity brings about 
alternative decision-making structures based on certain regions, it may mitigate 
                                                 
50  The recent remark on the “Yugoslav scenario” by Vladimir Putin makes it clear that Moscow has real 
concern about the US intervention from within. “My gorovy pobedit’ poslanıe Vladimira Putina v 
tsıtatakh (Мы готовы победить: послание Владимира Путина в цитатах)”, ТАСС, (TASS), 4 
декабря (December) 2014; China has the same concern for a long time, and underscores the 
importance to cooperate with Russia to ward off the threats. See “Cooperation with Russia a priority 
to Chinese military: senior official”, Peoples Daily, 19 Nov. 2014. 
51  “G20 summit: PM Narendra Modi pushes government agenda in repatriation of black money”, Indian 
Express, 16 Nov. 2014. 
52  “Russia, India, China to cooperate in energy, global issues”, Zee News, 3 Feb. 2015 
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the cultural exclusivity that globalization has hitherto produced and that have been 
one of the sources of extremism. 
What is clear is that fighting against the international jihadist threat is 
urgent, and it inevitably requires regional cooperation among states exposed to the 
threats, such those in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. As these 
regions have the same problems as Central Asia – among them differences of 
regimes, border disputes, and the absence of a military alliance – the SCO is a 
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Uluslararası Cihat Hareketi: Yeni bir tür tehdit ve bir çare olarak bölgesel 
işbirliği 
 
Musul’un ele geçirilmesi ve ardından gelen Irak Şam İslam Devleti (IŞİD)’nin Suriye ve Irak’ın sünni 
çoğunluğa sahip bölgesine yönelik yıldırım savaşı Selefi-cihatçıların oluşturduğu tehdidin ciddiyetini dünyaya 
hatırlattı. “Vahşetin yönetimi” taktiğini dış kaynak ve bağlantılarla birleştirerek IŞİD yeni tür çatışmanın 
mevcut uluslararası düzene oluşturabileceği tüm potansiyeli gerçekleştirmede başarılı olmuştur. Mary Kaldor 
tarafından formüle edildiği gibi “Yeni Savaş” küreselleşmenin getirdiği ulus devletlerin ikili erozyonunun 
ürünüdür. Ulus devletlerin artan kötü çalışmaları nedeniyle ve suç grupları ağlarının uluslararasılaşması da söz 
konusuyken organize şiddet ve sınır kontrolü üzerindeki hükümet tekelini güvenceye almak daha zor hale 
gelmiştir. Şu ana kadar, ABD’nin liderliğindeki koalisyon tarafından IŞİD’e karşı yürütülen savaşın ulusal 
güvenlik konusunda daha eski düşünceye dayalı stratejisi ile IŞİD türü tehditleri kontrol altına almaktan çok 
çoğalmalarına yardımcı olduğu görülmektedir. Başarısızlığın ana nedenlerinden birisi ABD’nin istemediği 
rejimleri devirmek için bir araç olarak aşırıcı ağları desteklemesinin yarattığı bağlamda yatmaktadır. Bu, 
İŞİD’in ABD’nin Afganistan, Bosna, Çeçenistan, Irak ve Suriye’deki örtülü müdahalelerinin son ürünü olduğu 
gerçeğiyle kanıtlanmıştır. Bu makale, Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü (ŞİÖ)’nün Orta Asya’daki İslamcı terörizme karşı 
mücadelesindeki uyumlu polisliğinin ve istihbarat alışverişinin etkinliğini değerlendirmekte ve bazı ortak 
değerlere dayalı askeri bir ittifaktan ziyade pragmatik ve sınırlı amaçlara dayalı bölgesel işbirliğinin İŞİD’in 
temsil ettiği yeni tür tehditlerle başa çıkmak için daha iyi bir model olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Böyle bir 
bölgesel işbirliğinin daha istikrarlı bir yönetimi getirme potansiyeli vardır ve oluşturduğu ekonomik zeminle 
üyelerine terörle mücadeleye zarar veren dış politik baskılara karşı daha fazla esneklik sağlamanın yanında 
karşılıklı yarar amacıyla ekonomik kalkınma için üyelerine zeminler de kazandırır.  
Anahtar kelimeler: IŞİD, Cihat hareketi, selefi, yeni savaş, Orta Doğu, Balkanlar, Orta Asya, ŞİÖ. 
 
